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THE SITUATION-DEPENDENCY OF PERCEPTION*
How can perception give us knowledge of the world? One ofthe challenges in answering this question is that we alwaysperceive objects from a particular location, under particular
lighting conditions, and similar features of the environment that de-
termine the way objects are presented. Despite this fact, we can per-
ceive the shape and color of objects.1 We can perceive the shape of
objects although only the facing surfaces are visible, and we can
perceive two same-sized objects located at different distances to be the
same size. Similarly, we can perceive the uniform color of a yellow wall
although parts of it are illuminated more brightly than others, and we
can recognize the sound of a cello regardless of whether it is played
on a street or in a concert hall. More generally, subjects can perceive
the properties objects have regardless of the situational features, al-
though the way an object is presented always depends on the situa-
tional features.
When I speak of objects without further qualification, I mean mind-
independent, external objects, such as cats and tables. Let us call the
properties that an object has regardless of the situational features the
intrinsic properties of the object. An intrinsic property of an object is a
* I am indebted to Keith Allen, Robert Audi, Stephen Engstrom, Alan Ha´jek, Benj
Hellie, Anjana Jacob, James John, Uriah Kriegel, William Lycan, Mohan Matthen,
Anders Nes, Gurpreet Rattan, Sydney Shoemaker, Declan Smithies, Evan Thompson,
Timothy Williamson, Wayne Wu, and the members of the Australian National University
philosophy of mind reading group for comments on a draft of this paper. Special thanks
are due to David Chalmers, Anil Gupta, John McDowell, and Jonathan Schaffer. I am
also grateful to members of audiences at the ANU, University of Oslo, University of
Oxford, and Rutgers University—in particular Herman Cappelen, Bill Fish, Jason
Stanley, Fiona Macpherson, and Kim Sterelny. Thanks finally to the Norwegian Research
Council for generous funding while I was writing this paper.
1 Of course, there are breakdown conditions. One cannot, for instance, tell whether
a shape is a sphere or a cube, if one perceives it from sufficiently close up.
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property that does not depend on the object’s relations to other
individuals distinct from itself. The intrinsic properties that are of
relevance to the current discussion are the perceivable intrinsic prop-
erties.2 Let us call the features of the environment that determine
the way an object is presented the situational features. The lighting
conditions and the subject’s location in relation to perceived objects
are the situational features that are typically the most salient for
the ways objects are presented—at least for human visual perception.
If the way an object is presented always depends on the situational
features, then an explanation is needed for how one can have
knowledge of the intrinsic properties of objects through perception.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to such an explanation. The
main thesis is that perceptual experience is necessarily situation-
dependent. Call this the situation-dependency thesis. In short the idea is
that the way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it
appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is
presented given the situational features. I argue that the way an object
is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-
independent, but situation-dependent properties that the object
2 For a discussion of intrinsic properties, see Brian Weatherson, “Intrinsic vs.
Extrinsic Properties,” in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006).
In the context of the present discussion, I take for granted that colors are external,
mind-independent, and intrinsic properties of surfaces, solids, or light. For a defense
of colors as intrinsic properties, see Alex Byrne and David Hilbert, “Color Primitivism,”
in Ralph Schumacher, ed., Perception and the Status of Secondary Qualities (Boston: Kluwer,
forthcoming). My argument is agnostic on the different possible ways of treating col-
ors as mind-independent properties. So it is agnostic on views according to which colors
are reflectance properties and so-called primitivist and naı¨ve realist accounts of colors.
For a defense of an understanding of colors as reflectance properties, see Mohan
Matthen, “Biological Functions and Perceptual Content,” this journal, lxxxv, 1 ( Jan-
uary 1988): 5–27; and Byrne and Hilbert, “Color Realism and Color Science,” Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, xxvi, 1 (February 2003): 3–21. For critical discussions, see C.L.
Hardin, Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988); and
Brian McLaughlin, “Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness,” in Aleksander
Jokic¸ and Quentin Smith, eds., New Essays on Consciousness (New York: Oxford, 2003),
pp. 97–154. For a defense of a naı¨ve realist view of color, see John Campbell, “A Simple
View of Colour,” in John Haldane and Crispin Wright, eds., Reality: Representation and
Projection (New York: Oxford, 1993), pp. 257–68. Colors understood in terms of dis-
positional properties are often considered to be mind-independent; for example, Syd-
ney Shoemaker, “On the Way Things Appear,” in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne,
eds., Perceptual Experience (New York: Oxford, 2006), pp. 461–80. Similarly, views that
analyze what it is for something to be colored in terms of what it is for something to look
colored are sometimes considered to be compatible with the idea that colors are mind-
independent; for example, Alva Noe¨, Action in Perception (Cambridge: MIT, 2004).
Insofar as such accounts treat colors in terms of experiences of color, they are just a
version of the view that colors are mind-dependent properties. For an excellent de-
fense of this thesis, see Keith Allen, “The Mind-Independence of Colour,” European
Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
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has given its intrinsic properties and the situational features.3 I will
spell out the situation-dependency thesis in terms of the idea that
perception represents situation-dependent properties. To a first
approximation, situation-dependent properties are extrinsic, mind-
independent properties that are exclusively sensitive to and ontolog-
ically dependent on intrinsic properties and the situational features.
They play a pivotal epistemic role insofar as the perception of in-
trinsic properties is epistemically dependent on the representation of
situation-dependent properties. By arguing for this epistemic depen-
dency, I aim to establish that the situation-dependency of perception
is a desideratum for any account of perception.
My argument has three parts. First, I argue for the situation-
dependency thesis. Second, I show that perception of the intrinsic
properties of objects is epistemically dependent on representations
of situation-dependent properties. Third, I argue that recognizing
the situation-dependency thesis makes it possible to acknowledge
that objects are presented a certain way, while holding on to the
intuition that subjects directly perceive physical objects. Before I em-
bark on this project it will be helpful to motivate the situation-
dependency thesis in light of standard views of perception.
i. background
Traditionally, the way an object is presented given the situational
features has been downplayed or conflated with either the way the
object appears to one (which is a matter of the phenomenology of
perception) or with the way one represents the object (which is a mat-
ter of perceptual content).4 Views that downplay the fact that objects
are presented a certain way given the situational features insist that
subjects perceive the intrinsic properties of objects directly. If we per-
ceive intrinsic properties directly, then it would seem that there is no
need to appeal to what I call situation-dependent properties.
3 This use of the phrase that objects are presented in a certain way must be dis-
tinguished from the use of the phrase that picks out a subjective, sensational property
of experience. John McDowell writes of the determinateness with which shades of
colors “are presented in one’s visual experience”—Mind and World (Cambridge: Har-
vard, 1994), p. 56. What McDowell has in mind here is a particular phenomenon of
the sensible qualities of experience. McDowell’s idea of something being presented in
one’s visual experience must be distinguished from the idea I am concerned with,
namely the idea of the way objects are presented understood in terms of the mind-
independent, situation-dependent properties of objects.
4 Appearances have in turn been understood in terms of the way an object is per-
ceived, the way it is given in experience, the way it is presented in one’s visual ex-
perience, or some other mind-dependent property of experience. These notions differ
substantially, but all concern the phenomenology of experience.
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Against such naı¨ve direct realist views,5 I argue that if we take
seriously how subjects gain knowledge through perception, we must
acknowledge that the way an object is presented depends on the
situational features. I will argue that it follows from this that per-
ceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent
on representing the relevant situation-dependent properties. If this is
right, then the question of how subjects can have perceptual knowl-
edge of objects cannot be answered by insisting that we perceive
intrinsic properties directly.
A second influential line of thought in the philosophy of perception
is to understand the ways objects are presented given the situational
features as mind-dependent. This line of thought goes back to Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume. Hume writes: “[T]he table, which we see, seems to
diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists
independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but
its image, which was present to the mind.”6 By presupposing that the
appearance of an object is a case of an illusion, Hume is led to conclude
that appearances are mind-dependent items of sorts. The thought that
there is something present to the mind that is distinct from the per-
ceived object has motivated different versions of phenomenalism, sense-
data theories, and indirect realism.7 The details of these views differ
radically, in particular with respect to the ontological and epistemo-
logical status of that which is directly present to the mind. What the
views in this tradition have in common is the thesis that what is di-
rectly present to consciousness is a mind-dependent property or object
rather than a property of the physical object that the perception is of.8
5 It is important to distinguish “naı¨ve direct realism” from “naı¨ve realism” as
defended, for example, by Michael Martin, “The Reality of Appearances,” in Mark
Sainsbury, ed., Thought and Ontology (Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, 1997), pp. 81–106.
The former is a thesis about the direct object of perception; the latter is a thesis about
the mind-independence of the objects, properties, and relations that we perceive.
6 Hume, “An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,” in Enquiries Concerning
Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H.
Nidditch, eds. (New York: Oxford, 1975), p. 152.
7 H.H. Price famously argues that sense-data are mind-dependent, nonphysical
objects. See his Perception (London, UK: Methuen, 1950, first published 1932). Frank
Jackson defends the existence of nonphysical sense-data on the basis of linguistic
analysis. See his Perception (New York: Cambridge, 1977). He interprets the claim
“object x looks red” as having the underlying form, “Subject S sees a red sense-datum
belonging to x.” More recently, he has distanced himself from his unabashed sense-
data view. See his From Metaphysics to Ethics (New York: Oxford, 1998). I follow A.D.
Smith in treating sense-data theories as a version of indirect realism. See his The Problem
of Perception (Cambridge: Harvard, 2002).
8 This thesis is compatible with the claim that the intentional object of perception
is an external, mind-independent object and with the claim that perceptual content
represents (possibly among other things) external and mind-independent objects.
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Against the views in this tradition, I argue that at least part of
what is typically understood as mind-dependent should be under-
stood in terms of the situation-dependency of perception. In short,
the idea is that the ways objects are presented are best understood
as external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties
of the object. Understanding the ways objects are presented as ex-
ternal and mind-dependent makes it possible to distinguish between
the subjective aspect of perception, on the one hand, and its ob-
jective, but situation-dependent aspect on the other.
The distinction between the subjective and objective properties of
perception has been understood in many different ways, but all con-
cern the dependence or independence of perception on the subject’s
sensibility or cognition. In the idealist tradition, the distinction is under-
stood to mark the extent to which subjects perceive reality indepen-
dently of their sensibility or cognition. Insofar as perception is subjective,
perception is understood to be constitutive of its object. In the phenome-
nological tradition, the distinction is understood to mark the extent to
which the object of phenomenal consciousness is mind-dependent.
Phenomenalism, indirect realism, and direct realism differ with
respect to what constitutes the object of perception. The question of
what perception is of and what perception represents must be dis-
tinguished from the question of how the relationship between the
representational content and the phenomenology of experience is
conceived. The argument presented here is agnostic on the answer
to the second question. If the argument holds at all, it will hold re-
gardless of how the debate on the relation between the representa-
tional content and the phenomenology of experience is resolved. The
present discussion does however relate to that debate insofar as I
argue that at least part of what is often conceived of only in terms
of the phenomenology of experience should be thought of, at least
in part, in terms of representations of external, mind-independent
properties of objects. This by no means amounts to a denial of non-
representational appearance properties. As I will argue in the next
section, the thesis that perception involves representations of situation-
dependent properties is compatible with these properties being ac-
companied by appearance properties.
ii. the argument for the situation-dependency thesis
Phenomenalists and indirect realists treat the ways objects appear
as something mind-dependent. There are no doubt mind-dependent
ways that objects appear. However one understands these mind-
dependent ways that objects appear, I will argue that experience
represents the mind-independent ways that objects are presented given
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the situational features. The way an object is presented can be under-
stood strictly externally, namely as determined by the object’s intrinsic
properties and the situational features.9 For the visual perception of
size and shape, the perceiver’s location in relation to the perceived
object is the crucial situational feature that determines how the ob-
ject is presented. For the perception of color, the lighting conditions
and color context are among the crucial situational features.
If the way an object is presented is understood as external and
mind-independent, it can be understood in terms of the properties
the object has given the situational features, that is, the object’s
situation-dependent properties.10 Situation-dependent properties are
(nonconstant) functions of the intrinsic properties of the object
and the situational features. This means that fixing the intrinsic
properties and the situational features fixes the situation-dependent
properties. Furthermore, situation-dependent properties are onto-
logically dependent on and exclusively sensitive to intrinsic proper-
ties and situational features.11
It will be helpful to consider some examples. Take the cup on
my table. It is presented in a certain way given my location. One side
9 This thesis draws on several well-known concepts: Noe¨’s (op. cit.) notion of P-
properties and Christopher Peacocke’s notion of a scene—A Study of Concepts
(Cambridge: MIT, 1992), see especially chapter 3. As I show below, situation-dependent
properties can be understood as the properties constituting scenes. I discuss Noe¨’s view
in my “Action and Self-Location in Perception,” Mind, cxvi, 463 ( July 2007): 603–32.
In brief, Noe¨ understands P-properties as projections on a plane perpendicular to the
subject’s line of sight. Although he insists that they are objective, mind-independent
properties, he analyzes them in terms of how things look to perceivers, more specifically
in terms of what he calls phenomenal objectivism and in terms of the psychological
notion of a visual field. In this respect, they are the very same kind of properties that
James J. Gibson refers to as visual field properties and Peacocke refers to as sensational
properties. See Gibson, The Perception of the Visual World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1950); and Peacocke, “Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject,”
in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, in a special issue on the Philosophy of Mind edited
by Joe¨lle Proust (forthcoming). For a defense of this thesis, see Allen, “Being Coloured
and Looking Coloured” (manuscript). Matthen argues for an idea that is similar to
Noe¨’s—Seeing, Doing, and Knowing (New York: Oxford, 2005). According to Matthen, a
surface is presented as it is—color-wise—in part because of a property it has, its color,
and in part because of the condition it is in. In contrast to P-properties, situation-
dependent properties are not analyzed in terms of how things look. Furthermore, they
are not properties of the visual field and are not two-dimensional geometrical
projections. However, as I will argue, recognizing situation-dependent properties is
compatible with there being properties that capture how things look.
10 An alternative label might be “relational properties.” But relational properties
have been understood as properties that involve relations to a perceiver’s mind. For
discussion, see Evan Thompson, Colour Vision (New York: Routledge, 1995). Since the
properties I am introducing are a function only of external, mind-independent fea-
tures it is important to distinguish them clearly from such relational properties.
11 Thanks to Alan Ha´jek for helpful discussions about different ways of understand-
ing relations of ontological dependence.
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is closer than the other; one part faces away from me. Its shape is
presented in an egocentric frame of reference, which in turn means
that the object and its parts are presented as standing in specific
spatial relations to me. The way the cup is presented to a location is
on the suggested view an external and mind-independent, albeit
situation-dependent property of the world. Any perceiver occupying
the same location would, ceteris paribus, be presented with the cup in
the very same way. Similarly, the way the color of the cup is presented
is the way its intrinsic color property manifests itself given the current
lighting conditions. If the intrinsic color property is conceived of as a
reflectance property, then the correlating situation-dependent
property will be a wavelength emittence property.
It is conceivable that two objects with different intrinsic properties
can have the very same situation-dependent property given suitable
situational features. So it is conceivable that, say, a blue couch under
yellow lighting conditions has the very same situation-dependent
color property as a green couch under standard lighting conditions.
Furthermore, the thesis that there is a distinction between the
situation-dependent properties and the intrinsic properties of an
object is compatible with the existence of cases in which the situation-
dependent and intrinsic properties of an object match. Say I am
looking at the round rim of a cup from directly above. From such a
location, the rim of the cup is presented as round. But even in this
case, there is a metaphysical distinction between the two properties.
The important point is that given the spatiotemporal nature of per-
ception,12 there is a distinction between the way an object is presented
and the way it is regardless of the situational features. In other words,
there is a distinction between the situation-dependent and the in-
trinsic properties of an object.
The idea of situation-dependent properties can be understood in
terms of Christopher Peacocke’s notion of a scene. A scene is “the
volume of the real world around the perceiver at the time of the ex-
perience, with an origin and axes in the real world fixed in accordance
with the labeling of the scenario.”13 The scenario is a way of locating ob-
jects, properties, and relations in relation to a labeled origin and axes.
The elements of a scene can be understood as situation-dependent
spatial properties. An object is presented in different ways to different
locations in a world and it is an objective mind-independent feature
of the object that it is so presented. Since situation-dependent spatial
properties are location-relative properties rather than perceiver-relative
12 I elaborate on this spatiotemporal nature of perception in section iii.
13 Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, p. 64.
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properties, any perceiver occupying the same location is, ceteris paribus,
presented with the very same situation-dependent spatial properties.
The distinction between a scene and a world that is not location-
relative is, however, only helpful to bring out the contrast between
intrinsic spatial properties and the correlating situation-dependent
properties. It is not helpful to bring out the contrast between intrinsic
colors or sounds and the correlating situation-dependent properties.
The reason is that the situational features relevant for perceiving
spatial properties is location-relative (for instance, the distance from
the perceiver and the orientation relative to the perceiver), while the
situational features relevant for perceiving color properties are not
(for instance, the lighting conditions). Lighting conditions are pres-
ent in the scene and the world that is not location-relative. Therefore,
the distinction between intrinsic color properties and the correlating
situation-dependent properties cannot be analyzed in terms of the
distinction between scenes and the world that is not location-relative.
What we need is a distinction between scenes and the intrinsic prop-
erties in the relevant part of the uncentered world. That is just the
distinction between situation-dependent and intrinsic properties.14
The very same two aspects that are involved in veridical perception
can be argued to be involved in cases of illusion and hallucination,
at least if the illusion or hallucination is of a seemingly colored and
three-dimensional space-occupier. When one hallucinates an elf, one
has a seeming point of view in relation to the elf. One can distinguish
between the way the elf seems to fill out space from the way it seems
to be presented given one’s location. So the distinction between
situation-dependent and intrinsic (hallucinated) properties holds for
cases of illusion and hallucination in the very same way as it holds
for cases of accurate perception.
Thinking about the ways objects are presented in terms of situation-
dependent properties makes it possible to acknowledge that as the
situational features change, perceptual content remains the same with
regard to the intrinsic properties of objects, but changes with regard to
the situation-dependent properties. Furthermore, by understanding the
ways objects are presented in terms of situation-dependent properties,
the difference between how objects are presented and how one perceives
14 With certain qualifications, situation-dependent properties could also be under-
stood as what constitutes a centered world or in terms of centered properties. The
distinction between a centered and an uncentered world is, however, only helpful to
bring out the contrast between intrinsic spatial properties and the correlating situation-
dependent properties. It is not helpful to bring out the contrast between intrinsic colors
or sounds and the correlating situation-dependent properties.
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them to be can be clearly brought out as a difference in what is perceived,
and thereby distinguished from any differences in the ways in which an
object, property, or relation is perceived. The point is to distinguish
(1) the way an object is presented given the situational features
from any
(2) mind-dependent objects or properties.15
The distinction between situation-dependent and intrinsic properties
is not a distinction between the properties objects appear to have and
the properties those objects actually have. Nor is it a distinction be-
tween the properties objects appear to have and the properties our
experience represents objects as having. Since both intrinsic and
situation-dependent properties are external and mind-independent,
the distinction between them does not run parallel to the distinction
between the properties of experience and the properties of ob-
jects. The distinction lies rather within the realm of external, mind-
dependent properties of objects.
I am not arguing that every phenomenological difference should
be understood in terms of a representational difference. Take Ernst
Mach’s example of perceiving a shape from the same angle once as a
square and once as a diamond. The difference in perception is due to
a difference in the way it is perceived. As Peacocke has argued, the way
it is perceived contributes to what it is like to have the experience
and is not captured in the representational content of perception.16
In such cases, there is no external difference to be represented and
so the difference in phenomenology cannot be explained in terms
of a difference in representations of mind-independent properties
or objects.
I am arguing only that what is often understood solely in terms
of mind-dependent properties or objects should be understood at
least in part in terms of situation-dependent properties. When one
changes one’s location in relation to a shape, the way the shape
is presented changes, that is, something external and mind-
independent changes, namely the situation-dependent property of
the object. In contrast to Mach’s case, the change in the experi-
15 The mind-dependent objects or properties can be understood for in stance in
terms of sensational properties, appearance properties, or any number of mind-
dependent ways that an object appears to a subject.
16 See, for instance, his A Study of Concepts, pp. 74–77, and also his “Does Per-
ception Have a Nonconceptual Content?,” this journal, xcviii, 5 (May 2001): 239–
64, p. 253f.
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ence due to the change in situational features can be explained
with regard to the situation-dependency, rather than the subjectiv-
ity of perception. To a first approximation the subjectivity of ex-
perience can be understood as any aspect of experience that is a
matter of mind-dependent properties or objects of the experience
rather than the external, mind-independent objects and properties
that the experience is of. The point of distinguishing the situation-
dependency from the subjectivity of perception is to contrast the
properties of external objects from the properties of experience
and the mind-dependent objects of experience.
Insisting that the ways objects are presented are mind-independent
is of course not to deny that representations of these ways are mind-
dependent. But it is crucial to distinguish
(3) representations of the way an object is presented given the situa-
tional features
from how the object appears to be and from the way the object is
presented. How one represents objects as being presented is de-
pendent on one’s sensory system. Representations have been under-
stood in many different ways. The present argument holds for any
understanding that is committed to the most basic principle of char-
acterizing perceptual content in terms of representations, namely,
that there is a distinction between the case in which things are as they
are represented to be and the case in which things are otherwise. In
other words, the only principle that the use of representations here is
committed to is that representations have accuracy conditions.17 This
commitment is neutral on the question of whether perceptual con-
tent is conceptual or nonconceptual, whether perceptual content is
propositional or image-like, or whether representational properties
are pure or impure.18
In the interest of generality, I will not commit myself to a particu-
lar way of thinking about representations other than representa-
17 In the context of this paper, I take for granted that experience is subject to
accuracy conditions. This idea has been denied by adverbialists, such as Roderick
Chisholm—see his Perceiving (Ithaca: Cornell, 1957). More recently, the thesis has
been argued against by Charles Travis, “Silence of the Senses,” Mind, cxiii, 449 ( Jan-
uary 2004): 57–94; and by Bill Brewer, “Perception and Content,” European Journal of
Philosophy, xiv, 2 (August 2006): 165–81.
18 Pure representational properties are properties of representing a content, while
impure representational properties are properties of representing a content in a cer-
tain way. For a defense of this distinction, see Chalmers, “The Representational Char-
acter of Experience,” in Brian Leiter, ed., The Future for Philosophy (New York: Oxford,
2004), pp. 153–81.
64 the journal of philosophy
tions having accuracy conditions. It is crucial, however, to be spe-
cific about what is represented when a subject has a scene in view.
What one represents cannot simply reflect how objects are
presented. It cannot be right that subjects, say, represent every-
thing that they have in view. A myopic perceiver will represent less
detail than someone with excellent vision given the very same scene,
and a cat will represent something different from a human because
its sensory apparatus is set up differently. Thus, what a subject rep-
resents must depend on what is perceptually available to her. What is
perceptually available to a subject is determined by what could be
perceptually discerned by her, which in turn is determined by her
perceptual system. The number of leaves on a tree is, for example,
not perceptually available to most humans, since our perceptual
system does not have the capacity to perceive numbers of similar
objects far beyond five. There is a further complication. Subjects are
not necessarily aware of everything that is perceptually available to
them. Say I see a tree swaying in the breeze. I might not be aware of
the specific movement of a particular leaf fluttering in the breeze or
a bug on one of the twigs, although these are details that are
perceptually available to me and thus details of which I could be
aware. So what is perceptually available must be determined dis-
positionally: for something to be perceptually available is for it to
be something of which a subject can be perceptually aware given
her perceptual system.
The important point for the present argument is that the dif-
ferences in our perceptual systems affect only what we represent
of a perceived scene. It does not affect the situation-dependent
properties. It is crucial to distinguish both between what is there
to be picked up and what one’s perceptual system can pick up,
as well as between what one’s perceptual system in fact picks up
and what one is perceptually conscious of. How one represents
situation-dependent properties and what one represents when one
has a particular scene in view depends on one’s perceptual sys-
tem. By contrast, the situation-dependent properties are there to be
picked up regardless of whether one is the kind of perceiver that
can pick them up and regardless of whether one actually does pick
them up. In this respect, situation-dependent properties are just like
intrinsic properties.
It will be helpful to work through an example. Consider Peacocke’s
example of two same-sized trees located at different distances from
a subject. Peacocke analyzes the difference between the actual and
the apparent sizes of the trees in terms of “a duality of represen-
tational properties and properties of the two-dimensional visual
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field.”19 He identifies the properties of the two-dimensional visual
field as sensational properties. So according to Peacocke, the dif-
ference between the perceptions of each tree is a difference in sen-
sations, not a difference in representations.
By recognizing situation-dependent properties, at least part of
what Peacocke understands as a difference in sensations can be re-
duced to a difference in representations of situation-dependent prop-
erties. So Peacocke’s duality can be thought of as a duality within
the representational properties. Such an approach allows one to
think of the apparent difference in size not as an aspect of the visual
field, but rather as an aspect of the world as it is presented to the
perceiver’s location. I am not denying that there is a visual field and
I am not denying that the representations of situation-dependent
properties could be matched by sensational properties. I am argu-
ing that Peacocke’s trees can be explained without appeal to the
psychological notion of a visual field. They can be explained with
regard to the world as it presents itself to the perceiver’s location,
that is, with regard to external, mind-independent, but situation-
dependent properties of objects. Since the situation-dependent prop-
erties are actual properties of the object given the situational features,
one can say that there is a difference between the perception of the
two trees with regard to the properties represented, and thus a dif-
ference in the externally individuated content of perception. In the
veridical case, experience represents the trees as having the same in-
trinsic size properties, but as having different situation-dependent
size properties. Once representations of situation-dependent proper-
ties are recognized, the apparent difference in size between the trees
can be understood as a difference in situation-dependent proper-
ties. So once situation-dependent properties have been introduced,
there is no need to appeal to sensational properties in the subject’s
visual field to explain the apparent difference in size of the two trees.
Now one could object that this leads to the problem that percep-
tion will represent the trees as both the same size and as different
in size:
(a) (Tree1 and Tree2 are different in size, Tree1 and Tree2 are the same size)
This cannot be the right way of characterizing the content since it
would render the content incoherent. Since the situation-dependent
properties will differ from the intrinsic properties in any standard
19 Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations (New York:
Oxford, 1983), p. 13.
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case of perception, most perceptual contents (so characterized) will
exhibit a similar incoherence.
Since, however, the sense in which the two trees are different in
size is distinct from the sense in which they are the same size, the
content in the case at hand is not incoherent. When the two com-
ponents of perceptual content are assessed, they are assessed relative
to different aspects of the object (the object given the situational
features, the object regardless of the situational features). The in-
coherence of (a) is just a way of describing the puzzle of perception
that we are trying to come to grips with: one can perceive an object’s
intrinsic properties although the way an object is presented depends
on the situational features. By showing that subjects represent both
intrinsic and situation-dependent properties, it is possible to ac-
knowledge that there is a sense in which perceiving the two trees as
different in size is accurate: they really are presented as different in
size given the subject’s location in relation to the trees.
These considerations bring out a second problem with the way (a)
characterizes the content in question. The two trees do not look to be
both the same and different in size. They look to be the same size due
to the fact that the closer tree is presented as larger than the tree that
is further away. So the situation-dependent properties and intrinsic
properties are not on par. One could try to account for the difference
between the two properties by including more than the outcome of
the function:
(b) (Tree1 and Tree2 are different in size given the situational features,
Tree1 and Tree2 are the same size)
This suggestion is similar to Gilbert Harman’s suggestion. Harman
argues that the “feature of a tree from here is an objective feature of
the tree in relation to here, a feature to which perceivers are sensi-
tive and which their visual experience can somehow represent things
as having from here.”20
The problem with the content characterized by (b) is that it in-
volves more information than is required. The thesis that perception
represents situation-dependent properties as well as intrinsic prop-
erties does not require that the situational features under which an
object is perceived be represented. The specific angle at which one
perceives a table or the precise brightness of the light are features that
20 Harman, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” in James Tomberlin, ed.,
Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, Volume 4 (Northridge,
CA: Ridgeview, 1990), pp. 31–52.
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are arguably not perceptually available, at least not to most human
perceivers. More importantly, subjects can perceive the trees to be
different in size given their location, without being aware of their
location in relation to the trees. All that the situation-dependency
thesis is committed to is that subjects represent situation-dependent
properties and so the effect of situational features. This idea involves
no commitment to saying that subjects represent situational features.
Another way of bringing out the issue is with regard to the
difference between relational and monadic properties. Situation-
dependent properties can appear to be monadic properties. But a
property can appear to be monadic and nonetheless reveal itself to be
relational on reflection.21 Although situation-dependent properties
are relational properties insofar as they are a function of intrinsic
properties and situational features, they need not be represented as
relational properties. Moreover the fact that they are relational prop-
erties need not reveal itself in the phenomenology of perception.
One might want to take these considerations into account by char-
acterizing the content in the following way:
(c) (Tree1 and Tree2 are situation-dependently different in size, Tree1
and Tree2 are intrinsically the same size)
This proposal is similar to Michael Tye’s.22 Tye argues that “expe-
rience represents the nearer tree as having a facing surface that
differs in its viewpoint-relative size from the facing surface of the
further tree, even though it also represents the two trees as having
the same viewpoint-independent size” (ibid., p. 124).
The problem with this characterization of the content is that
the content represents whether a property is a situation-dependent
property or an intrinsic property. Although human perceivers might
typically be able to distinguish, say, the intrinsic shape of an object
from the correlated situation-dependent property, it is easy to
imagine a situation in which a subject is not able to tell whether a
perceived property is intrinsic or situation-dependent. Tye goes on
to argue that the nearer tree is represented as being larger from
here. This idea implies that perceivers are aware not only whether
a property is a situation-dependent property or an intrinsic prop-
erty; it implies that perceivers are aware of the situational features.
21 For a discussion of such features of properties, see Anil Gupta, “Meaning and
Misconceptions,” in Ray Jackendoff et al., eds., Language, Logic, and Concepts (Cam-
bridge: MIT, 1999), pp. 15–41.
22 Tye, “Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing,” in E. Villanueva, ed., Phil-
osophical Issues, Volume 7 (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1995), pp. 117–26.
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As I argued above this is cognitively too demanding a requirement
for perception.
These problems can be avoided by characterizing the content in
the following way:
(d) (Tree1 and Tree 2 are the same size¶, Tree1 and Tree2 are different
in sizeµ)
Metaphysically speaking the single primed property is a situation-
dependent property and the double primed property is an intrinsic
property. But perception need not represent these metaphysical facts.
An analogous analysis can be given for a case involving color
properties. Consider a subject who is perceiving a blue couch in
bright light. Due to the bright light, the couch is situation-
dependently green. The subject’s perceptual content can be char-
acterized in the following way:
(e) (that couch is blue¶, that couch is greenµ)
This way of characterizing the content makes it possible to ac-
knowledge that the situation-dependency thesis involves no commit-
ment to subjects knowing whether a property is a situation-dependent
property or an intrinsic property.
There are many possible ways of understanding the way situation-
dependent properties are reflected in the phenomenology of per-
ception. My argument is agnostic on how this issue is conceived. I
aim to establish that whatever stance is taken toward the way intrinsic
properties are reflected in phenomenology should be taken towards
the way situation-dependent properties are reflected in phenome-
nology. Whatever differences there are in phenomenology are ar-
guably psychological differences: For human perceivers, intrinsic
properties are usually more salient than situation-dependent prop-
erties. Therefore, they are typically in the foreground of our per-
ceptual phenomenology.23
23 David Chalmers discusses many possible ways of thinking about the phenome-
nology of the perceptual experience of a wall that is partially in shadow. See his
“Perception and the Fall from Eden,” in Gendler and Hawthorne, eds., Perceptual
Experience, pp. 49–125; in particular pp. 84–89. His distinction between simple and
complex phenomenology is particularly salient for the present discussion. On the
simple view, only what I call situation-dependent properties are reflected in the
phenomenology of an experience. On the complex view, the experience represents
an intrinsic property in conjunction with a situational feature. As I have argued, this
involves more information than required. The specific angle at which one perceives
a table or the precise brightness of the light are features that are arguably not per-
ceptually available, at least not to most human perceivers. I take it to be plausible that
typically both situation-dependent properties and intrinsic properties are reflected in
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This analysis is congenial to William Lycan’s argument24 that the
apparent difference in the sizes of Peacocke’s trees is represented
in experience. However, it differs from his analysis insofar as my
thesis is not understood to imply that something other than mind-
independent properties, objects, and relations are represented.
Lycan argues that perceptual representations have at least two layers.
One is concerned with external, mind-independent physical objects,
properties, and relations; the other is concerned with mind-dependent
intentional objects and relational properties, namely colored shapes:
“We do visually represent the trees as being of the same size etc., but
we do that by representing colored shapes and relations between
them. Some of the shapes—in particular those corresponding to the
trees—are represented as being larger shapes than others, as oc-
cluding others, and so forth. As with all intentional objects, it does
not follow that there are any actual things that have such relational
properties” (ibid., p. 95). Lycan introduces a kind of mind-dependent
intentional object to account for the two trees appearing different
in size. He mirrors Hume’s motivation for introducing such objects
when he writes: “in Peacocke’s example there are a veridical road-
and-same-sized trees presentation and an illusory different-sized-
tree-shapes presentation made in the same visual experience. The
experience has one truth-condition that would be satisfied by the
apparent different-sized shapes, and another that is satisfied by
the same-sized tress. It happens that the former is actually not satis-
fied and in that sense there is an illusion” (ibid., p. 129). On Lycan’s
view, a subject’s experience of the trees represents two same-sized
trees as well as two intentional objects, one larger than the other.
He argues that the representation of such intentional objects, say, a
colored shape, need not imply that the colored shape exists. The
shape is an object, but it is not an object that actually exists (ibid., p. 90).
Recognizing situation-dependent properties makes it possible to
acknowledge that there is nothing illusory about representing the
trees to be presented as different in size given the situation. Indeed
given the situation, representing the trees to be presented as differ-
ent in size is correct. Since situation-dependent properties are actual
the phenomenology of an experience. So my view suggests neither Chalmers’s simple
or complex view about phenomenology, but rather a third view. Call it the multiplex
view. I will save a detailed discussion of the role that situation-dependent properties
play in phenomenology for a future occasion.
24 Lycan, “Layered Perceptual Representations,” and “Replies to Tomberlin, Tye,
Stalnaker, and Block,” in Villanueva, ed. (op. cit.), pp. 81–100, 127–42.
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properties of the environment, the thesis that experience represents
them involves no commitment to saying that experience represents
anything other than mind-independent properties, objects, and re-
lations. Recognizing situation-dependent properties is, however,
compatible with Lycan’s thesis that experience represents intentional
objects. Similarly, one can recognize situation-dependent properties
and nonetheless be a phenomenalist or an indirect realist. On such
a view, there will be mind-dependent objects or properties that
stand in representation relations to both intrinsic properties and to
situation-dependent properties.
But although formally consistent with phenomenalism and indi-
rect realism, recognizing situation-dependent properties undermines
at least one traditional motivation for such views. As I argued earlier,
one traditional motivation is that when a subject, say, moves away
from a table something becomes smaller. Since it is not the table
that becomes smaller, what is directly present to the mind must
be something other than the table. If one recognizes situation-
dependent properties, no appeal to mind-dependent objects or prop-
erties is necessary to explain how there can be a way that objects
look that is not accounted for by representing their external, mind-
independent properties. Indeed, such cases are explained better
with appeal to representations of two kinds of mind-independent
properties: when one moves away from the table the situational fea-
tures change while the intrinsic properties remain the same. The
change in situation-dependent properties accounts for the change
in the experience. If such cases are better explained with appeal
to two kinds of mind-independent properties, then once situation-
dependent properties are introduced, the mind-dependent objects
or properties are obsolete.
There are, however, other reasons to introduce mind-dependent
objects or properties. One is that mind-dependent sensational prop-
erties are what make an experience an experience.25 A second is to
account for the possibility that hallucinatory and veridical experi-
ences are phenomenologically indistinguishable.26 A third is to ac-
count for the possibility of spectrum inversion. Sydney Shoemaker
introduces appearance properties to reconcile the possibility of an
intentionalist account of perception with phenomenal spectrum
25 For a defense, see Peacocke, “Sensational Properties.”
26 I am following Timothy Williamson in using the expression of phenomenolog-
ical indistinguishability to pick out an epistemic notion—Identity and Discrimination
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990). On this understanding, for two experiences to be phenom-
enologically indistinguishable just is for the subject not to be able to distinguish them.
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inversion without misrepresentation.27 Take two subjects, one of
which is spectrum inverted. Both subjects correctly represent a red
tomato as red, but the phenomenology of their experiences differs.
While one subject experiences the phenomenology that I experience
when I am acquainted with red objects, the other subject experiences
the phenomenology that I experience when I am acquainted with
green objects. Representations of appearance properties are intro-
duced to account for the difference in phenomenology. The subjects
represent the tomato as having different appearance properties, but
neither of them is misrepresenting.28 Appearance properties are either
occurrent or dispositional properties. An occurrent appearance prop-
erty is the property of currently producing a certain experience in a
perceiver; a dispositional appearance property is a disposition to cause
experiences of a certain sort in a kind of perceiver. According to Shoe-
maker, the phenomenal character of experience consists in the rep-
resentation of either kind of appearance property.29
There are two parameters on which situation-dependent proper-
ties differ from appearance properties. While an appearance property
“is such that something one sees has it just in case it appears to one to
have it,”30 a situation-dependent property is a property that a per-
ceived object can have without one being conscious of it having
the property. Put more simply, situation-dependent properties are
properties that objects actually have given the situational features
regardless of what any potential perceiver could pick up given its
sensory capacities. So while appearance properties are relative to the
sensory capacities of a potential perceiver, no reference to a perceiver
(or a potential perceiver) is necessary to specify the situation-
dependent properties of an object.
The second difference concerns the question of how many kinds of
properties are in the external, mind-independent realm. On Shoe-
maker’s view, experience of colors requires representing properties
27 Shoemaker used to call these properties “phenomenal properties” but has
changed his terminology to “appearance properties.” See his “Introspection and Phe-
nomenal Character,” Philosophical Topics, xxviii (2001): 247–73.
28 For a critical discussion of Shoemaker’s appearance properties as candidates for
reconciling the possibility of spectrum inversion and intentionalism, see Andy Egan,
“Appearance Properties?,” Nouˆs, xl, 3 (September 2006): 495–521.
29 Recently, Shoemaker has argued that the phenomenal character sometimes does
not consist in the representation of appearance properties, but rather in the rep-
resentation of one or another of the aspects of perceivable properties that he calls
qualitative aspects. See his “On the Way Things Appear.” But like appearance prop-
erties, qualitative aspects are characterized in terms of how they affect or are disposed
to affect the phenomenal character of experiences.
30 Shoemaker, “On the Way Things Appear,” p. 465.
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other than colors. Subjects perceive colors by perceiving properties
distinct from them. As a consequence, each color experience as-
cribes two different properties (ibid., p. 467). Michael Thau defends
a view in opposition to Shoemaker, according to which subjects per-
ceive colors by ascribing only one property.31 Thau calls it a nameless
intrinsic property. But like Showmaker, Thau argues that perception
represents a property that is distinct from the color of the object that
tells the perceiver about the color of the object. In contrast to both
Shoemaker and Thau, I am arguing that experience of intrinsic col-
ors requires representing two kinds of mind-independent, external
properties of the object: intrinsic properties and situation-dependent
properties. While appearance properties are relative to what a par-
ticular kind of perceiver can pick up, both intrinsic properties and
situation-dependent properties are what are there to be picked up
regardless of what a particular perceiver can pick up.
So what I am concerned about is orthogonal to Shoemaker’s con-
cerns. Indeed one can embrace situation-dependent properties along
with Shoemaker’s appearance properties or any other kind of mind-
dependent properties. The mind-dependent properties will stand in
representation relations both to intrinsic properties and to situation-
dependent properties.
But what is the advantage of recognizing situation-dependent prop-
erties if one already has mind-dependent properties in place? There
are several advantages, which I will discuss in turn. One advantage is
that it makes it possible to recognize that more of experience is subject
to accuracy conditions than is traditionally acknowledged. For an
experience to be accurate it must not just get the intrinsic properties
of an object right, but also its situation-dependent properties. The
ways objects are presented given the situational features makes a dif-
ference to which perception it is. Perceptions are individuated more
finely than by objects and their intrinsic properties; they are indi-
viduated also by situation-dependent properties.32 If perceptions are
not just individuated by the objects they are of, but by the way those
objects are presented, then individuation of perceptual content nec-
31 See Thau’s Consciousness and Cognition (New York: Oxford, 2002).
32 Tye rejects the idea that perception is individuated by objects and their prop-
erties—Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge: MIT, 2000), and earlier in Ten
Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT, 1995). He argues that perception is indi-
viduated by its functional role. In the context of this paper, I am taking for granted that
perceptual content is individuated by the properties and objects that the perception is
of. This thesis (and thus my argument) is compatible with both externalism and
internalism about perceptual content. Furthermore, the thesis is compatible with
perception also being individuated by the phenomenal character of the experience.
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essarily requires appeal to facts about the situation in which the object
is presented. If this is right, then perception involves representations
not just of an object’s intrinsic properties, but also of its situation-
dependent properties. As a consequence, to assess whether an ex-
perience is accurate is not only to assess whether the right intrinsic
properties are represented, but also to assess whether the right
situation-dependent properties are represented. This is just to say that
the satisfaction of the accuracy conditions depends on accurately
representing both the object’s intrinsic properties and its situation-
dependent properties. If situation-dependent properties are external
and mind-independent properties, then they can be represented and
misrepresented in just the way that intrinsic properties can be rep-
resented and misrepresented.
In contrast to situation-dependent properties, mind-dependent
properties cannot strictly speaking be misrepresented. No doubt, one
can say that how things appear or seem to a subject S is accurate if,
and only if, things are as they appear. So if it appears to S that there is
something green before S, S’s experience is accurate if, and only if,
there is before S a physical object with a green surface. But that is not
to deny that it is true that things appear to S in that way.33 In other
words, how things appear to S is not the kind of thing that S can be
wrong about.
A second advantage is that it makes it possible to accommodate the
fact that there is a wide range of viewing conditions or situational
features that can count as normal.34 Situation-dependent properties
change as the situational features change, while intrinsic properties
remain constant.
In the rest of the paper, I will elaborate on two further advantages.
But first it is important to bring out one important consequence of
the situation-dependency thesis. If one recognizes situation-dependent
properties, then many cases of perceptual experiences that in the
philosophical literature are typically categorized as illusory or as
misrepresentations will turn out to be accurate perceptions—at least
33 It should be noted that D.M. Armstrong and others have argued that one can be
wrong about how things appear to one—see his A Materialist Theory of the Mind (New
York: Routledge 1968). For a discussion of the problem of misrepresenting appearance
properties, see Egan, p. 16 and also p. 22, as well as Allen (manuscript). It would lead
too far afield to discuss introspective fallibility and the possibility of misrepresenting
appearance properties here. I will save it for another occasion.
34 For discussion, see Hardin. Among many others, Wilfird Sellars’s account of
perception relies on the idea of normal viewing conditions. See his Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind, with an introduction by Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert
Brandom (Cambridge: Harvard 1977).
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with regard to their representations of situation-dependent prop-
erties. Take the stick partially immersed in water. Given the situa-
tional features the stick appears to be bent. Due to the different
refraction index of water and air, the stick is presented as bent. The
stick is not bent, but it is accurate to perceive it to be presented as bent
given the situational features.
Some illusions will retain their status, for instance, the Mu¨ller-Lyer
illusion and similar psychological illusions. The reason why one per-
ceives one stick as longer than the other despite the fact that they are
the same length is not due to representing two different situation-
dependent properties. The reason for the illusion is rather the
Gestalt principles of convergence and divergence: the lines at the
sides lead the eye either inward or outward thereby creating a false
impression of length.
This points to an important limit of the situation-dependency
thesis. I take it that only basic intrinsic properties such as shapes,
colors, sounds, and surface structures35 have correlating situation-
dependent properties. The same is not true of high-level perceivable
properties such as being happy, beautiful, or dangerous. This dis-
analogy does not, however, imply that the situation-dependency
thesis is restricted to perception of basic properties since, arguably,
perception of high-level properties is dependent on perception
of basic properties. If this is right, then every event of perception
will include perception of basic properties. As a consequence, the
situation-dependency thesis holds for all events of perception.
iii. the argument for the epistemic dependence thesis
I have argued that the ways objects are presented can be understood
as external, mind-independent, albeit situation-dependent proper-
ties of objects. Only if perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties
can be shown to be epistemically dependent on representations of
the relevant situation-dependent properties, can the suggested view,
however, be any better than naı¨ve direct realism. Call the thesis
that perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically
dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent
properties the epistemic dependence thesis. The intuition on which this
thesis is grounded is that one perceives an object’s intrinsic prop-
erties precisely because of the way the object is presented. One per-
35 My argument has focused on the case of visual perception, but I take it to extend to
all sensory modalities. It would lead too far afield to go into the specifics of all sensory
modalities here. The argument only extends to taste and olfaction under particular
assumptions of what the objects are of these two sensory modalities. Thanks to Rachael
Brown and Kim Sterelny for discussions on olfaction.
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ceives a table to remain constant in size as one moves away from it
precisely because it fills out less of one’s visual field. And one per-
ceives the rectangular shape of the table precisely because of the way
the shape is presented in one’s egocentric frame of reference. Sim-
ilarly, one perceives a uniformly white wall to be uniformly white
precisely because it is presented the way white walls are presented in
the very lighting conditions under which one is perceiving it.
There are many kinds of dependency relations. No one denies
that if a subject S sees a material object o, then o causally affects
S. Arguably, what is causally relevant is what I call the situation-
dependent properties of the object. Naı¨ve direct realists can ac-
knowledge such a causal dependence. But by arguing that it plays a
role only on a subpersonal level, they can deny that it is of any sig-
nificance for a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge.
Regardless of how one stands on the question of a causal-
dependence, there is, I will argue, an epistemic dependence of per-
ceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties on representations of
situation-dependent properties. The epistemic priority of the ways
objects are presented given the situational features is due to the
spatiotemporal nature of perception. Subjects differ dramatically in
the way their sensory organs are spatially extended. One can imagine
subjects who can perceive an object from several angles simulta-
neously. The way the sensory organs are spatially extended depends
on the particular kind of perceiver. But it is a necessary feature of
perception that subjects perceive from somewhere at some time. If
one necessarily perceives objects from a particular location at a
particular time, then the way an object is presented depends on the
situational features. As I will show, it follows from this that rep-
resentations of situation-dependent properties are the basis for
knowledge of intrinsic properties. Another way of expressing the
same point is that they are what James Pryor calls “justification-
making conditions” for perceptual knowledge of intrinsic proper-
ties.36 Consider again Peacocke’s trees. The nearer tree is presented as
larger than the tree that is further away. This difference in size with
regard to their situation-dependent properties is the basis for her
perceptual knowledge that the trees are the same size. The subject has
experiential evidence that the two trees are the same size. This
evidence is, however, parasitic on her evidence that the nearer tree is
presented as larger than the tree that is further away from her. Both
36 Pryor, “There Is Immediate Justification,” in Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, eds.,
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 181–201, espe-
cially, p. 182.
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layers of evidence are liable to defeat. However, if evidence for the
situation-dependent properties is defeated, the subject’s evidence for
the intrinsic properties is defeated, but not vice versa. Defeaters can
be understood in two ways. While undercutting defeaters block the line
of evidence from which the warrant actually arises, rebutting defeaters
provide independent lines of evidence warranting the contrary con-
clusion. If the subject’s evidence for the situation-dependent prop-
erties is defeated, then her evidence for the intrinsic properties is
undercut (and not just rebutted). It follows from this that the asym-
metry of defeat is grounded in an asymmetry of warrant. It is because
the evidence for the situation-dependent property is in the line of
evidence for the intrinsic property that defeat of the former entails
defeat of the latter. And it is because the evidence for the intrinsic
property is not in the line of evidence for the situation-dependent
property that defeat of the former does not entail defeat of the latter.
Thus, evidence for intrinsic properties is dependent on evidence for
situation-dependent properties both with regard to defeat and warrant.
This relation of epistemic dependence implies that perceptual
knowledge of intrinsic properties is mediated by representations of
situation-dependent properties. It need not imply, however, that sub-
jects arrive at perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties by a con-
scious inference 37 or that intrinsic properties are not perceptually
available. The whiteness of the wall to my right and the roundness of
the rim of the cup before me are perceptually available to me.38
Furthermore, the thesis that there is an epistemic primacy to
situation-dependent properties does not imply that they are primary
in perceptual consciousness. One could deny that when perceiving an
object one is at all aware of how it is presented given the situational
features: perceptual awareness is simply of the intrinsic properties.
Intuitions diverge strongly on whether perceptual awareness includes
the shadow play on the wall over and above the whiteness of the wall.
Certainly when perceiving a white wall humans typically do not attend
to the details of the shadows cast on the wall. But sometimes one
does attend to the shadows, for instance, when one takes a realistic
painter’s point of view. The important point for the present discus-
sion is that even if one’s attention is directed at an object’s intrinsic
properties, one can be aware of the way the object is presented.
37 For discussion, see McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge,” Proceedings
of the British Academy, lxviii (1982): 455–79.
38 I argue for a way of understanding how a subject moves from representations of
situation-dependent spatial properties to representations of intrinsic spatial properties
in my “Action and Self-Location in Perception.”
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Certainly, when one’s location in relation to an object changes, one is
typically aware of something changing regarding the shape or size of
the object. The argument for the situation-dependency of perception
requires that it is possible to be aware of the situation-dependent
properties of an object without attending to them. But it does not
depend on how the details of the relation between awareness and
attention are resolved. There are many ways of understanding the
relation between awareness and attention.39 One that seems particu-
larly conducive to the present discussion is Bill Brewer’s distinction
between foreground and background awareness.40
The fact that intrinsic rather than situation-dependent properties
typically occupy the attention of human perceivers may appear to
stand in conflict with the thesis that there is an epistemic primacy to
situation-dependent properties. But it is important to distinguish
between what is primary in perceptual consciousness from what is
causally primary and what is epistemically primary. I am arguing only
that situation-dependent properties are epistemically primary. Epi-
stemic primacy can but need not be understood to entail causal
primacy.41 Regardless of how one stands on the relation between
epistemic and causal primacy, no implication about phenomenologi-
cal primacy follows from either epistemic or causal primacy. The epi-
stemic dependency thesis does not imply that situation-dependent
properties are in the foreground of a subject’s perceptual aware-
ness, although it is of course possible that they are. The thesis is even
compatible with the claim that subjects are not aware of situation-
dependent properties, at least if one accepts that for a subject to have
evidence, the subject need not be aware of this evidence.42 If a subject
can have evidence without being aware of this evidence, then the
fact that intrinsic properties typically occupy the attention of at least
human perceivers does not stand in conflict with the thesis that per-
ceptual knowledge of the whiteness of the wall is epistemically depen-
39 For helpful accounts of this distinction, see Campbell, Reference and Conscious-
ness (New York: Oxford, 2002), and Ned Block, “Mental Paint,” in Martin Hahn and
Bjørn Ramberg, eds., Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge
(Cambridge: MIT, 2003), pp. 165–200.
40 See Brewer, Perception and Reason (New York: Oxford, 1999), especially sections
5.3.1 and 7.4.3.
41 For a defense of the idea that epistemic dependence entails causal dependence,
see Hilary Kornblith, “Naturalizing Rationality,” in Newton Garver and Peter H. Hare,
eds., Naturalism and Rationality (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986), pp. 115–33. For a
critical discussion of the thesis, see Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (New York:
Cambridge, 1993), pp. 99ff.
42 Michael Bergmann argues that a subject’s belief can be justified by something
even if the subject is not aware of that thing. See his Justification without Awareness
(New York: Oxford, 2006), especially chapter 1.
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dent on representing the way it is presented given the lighting con-
ditions. I take it to be plausible that subjects are always to some extent
aware of situation-dependent properties, but my thesis does not de-
pend on it.43
By pulling apart what is epistemically primary from what is phe-
nomenologically primary the suggested view differs from both stan-
dard direct and indirect realist views. On both views, the properties
and objects that are epistemologically primary are also phenomeno-
logically primary. According to naı¨ve direct realists intrinsic proper-
ties are argued to be both epistemologically and phenomenologically
prior. According to indirect realism, what is directly present to the
mind is argued to be a mind-dependent object or property (that corre-
lates to what I call situation-dependent properties). Arguably, indirect
realists are committed to the thesis that these mind-dependent ob-
jects or properties are both phenomenologically and epistemologi-
cally prior. Because on the suggested view there are two kinds of
external, mind-independent properties, what is epistemologically prior
need not coincide with what is phenomenologically prior.
Now, it is empirically well established that the process of bring-
ing about representations of situation-dependent and intrinsic prop-
erties are mutually dependent in the human visual system insofar as
information about situation-dependent properties is used to gain
information about intrinsic properties and vice versa.44 Acknowledg-
ing this fact is compatible with accepting the epistemic dependency
thesis insofar as the epistemic dependence between the two rep-
resentations is independent of the process by which these representa-
tions are brought about. The epistemic dependence is not a matter of
how the visual system arrives at the representations but a matter of
the relations of defeasibility and warrant.
I have argued that perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is
epistemically dependent on representing situation-dependent prop-
43 It has been argued that concepts such as “is red” should be analyzed in terms of
concepts used to pick out sense-experiences, such as “looks red.” The question of
whether representations of intrinsic properties are epistemically dependent on rep-
resentations of situation-dependent properties is orthogonal to the question of any
semantic dependence of “material-object” predicates on “looks”-predicates. For dif-
ferent versions of this thesis, see Chisholm; and see Roderick Firth, “Coherence,
Certainty, and Epistemic Priority,” this journal, lxi, 19 (October 1964): 545–57.
For a critical discussion, see Sellars, “Givenness and Explanatory Coherence,” this
journal, lxx, 18 (October 1973): 612–24.
44 Thanks to Kim Sterelny for pressing me on this point. For an excellent discussion
of the processing relation between viewpoint-invariant and viewpoint-relative repre-
sentations, see Jesse Prinz, Furnishing the Mind (Cambridge: MIT, 2002), in particular
chapters 6 and 7.
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erties. It is important to note that the epistemic dependency thesis
does not require that the representations of situation-dependent
properties constitute knowledge. The thesis is weaker: representa-
tions of situation-dependent properties are the basis for knowledge of
intrinsic properties. So I am presupposing that evidence need not
constitute knowledge. Moreover, I take it to be plausible that rep-
resentations of situation-dependent properties need not have a prop-
ositional structure. My thesis is, however, neutral on this issue. If,
however, representations of situation-dependent properties do not
constitute propositions, then the epistemic dependency thesis can
only be true if evidence for knowledge does not require that this
evidence is propositional.45
I have argued that perceptual knowledge of the intrinsic properties
of an object is epistemically dependent on representing the relevant
situation-dependent properties. If representing intrinsic properties is
dependent on representing their situation-dependent properties,
then the representation of situation-dependent properties must be a
necessary part of perceptual content. So perceptual content will cru-
cially differ from the content of a thought about the same object
insofar as a thought about an object does not necessarily represent
the object’s situation-dependent properties.46
There are many other ways of thinking about the difference be-
tween perceptual content and the content of thought. One is to say
that the fundamental difference between perception and thought is
that there are phenomenal or sensational properties present in per-
ception but not in thought.47 Another is to say that the difference
between the content of perception and the content of thought is a
structural or functional difference. Robert Brandom argues, for in-
stance, that the role of thoughts in language is inferential, while the
role of perceptions is noninferential.48 According to McDowell,49 we
employ the very same conceptual capacities passively in experience
45 It is typically taken for granted that evidence need not constitute knowledge and
need not be propositional—recently, for instance, by Bergmann. Williamson argues
that all evidence is knowledge and that all evidence is propositional—Knowledge and
Its Limits (New York: Oxford, 2000). It would go well beyond the scope of this paper
to consider Williamson’s argument here.
46 Demonstrative thoughts are a special case. Arguably they are based on perception
and to that extent mirror the situation-dependency of perception.
47 There are exceptions: Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that mental states,
such as beliefs and desires, have phenomenal character as well, See their “The Inten-
tionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in Chalmers,
ed., Philosophy of Mind (New York: Oxford, 2002), pp. 520–33.
48 See Brandom’s Making It Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard, 1994), chapter 4.
49 See McDowell’s Mind and World.
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that we employ actively in thoughts. Fred Dretske distinguishes the
content of experience and thought with regard to the origin of their
functions.50 According to Tye,51 thoughts are representations in a lin-
guistic medium, while experiences are representations in an image-
like medium. I stay agnostic on whether perception and thought
differ phenomenally and whether their content differs structurally or
functionally over and above the difference in what is represented. If
the argument I have given holds at all, it holds regardless of what
stance one takes on these other possible differences.
iv. the argument for the direct perception thesis
Due to the role of appearances in the tradition of Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume, the idea that objects are presented a certain way has been
considered to be at odds with the intuition that we directly perceive
objects. The notion of direct perception has been understood in
many different ways. As I understand it, one perceives an object di-
rectly if one does not perceive it in virtue of perceiving another thing.
This conception must be contrasted with a notion according to which
to perceive something directly would be to be perceptually aware of it
without bringing any capacities to bear on what is given in perception
that are not narrowly construed sensory capacities.52
If the ways objects are presented given the situational features are
distinguished both from how they appear to be and from repre-
sentations of the ways objects are presented, then there is no conflict
between the intuition that we perceive objects directly and the claim
that objects are presented a certain way given the situational features.
Since situation-dependent properties are actual properties of an
object, we perceive an object directly by perceiving its situation-
dependent properties directly.
The objection could be raised that this way of thinking about
perception is committed to an epistemic intermediary and thus sub-
ject to the very same objections that can be raised against indirect
realism. According to indirect realism, one perceives objects in-
50 See Dretske’s Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge: MIT, 1995).
51 See Tye’s Consciousness, Color, and Content.
52 The first understanding has been considered a non-epistemological characteriza-
tion of direct perception, the second an epistemological characterization of direct
perception (see, for instance, Jackson, Perception). There are other ways of char-
acterizing direct perception epistemologically, the differences depending largely on
what one means by epistemological. Paul Snowdon characterizes an epistemological
understanding of direct perception as the idea that something is directly perceived
if and only if it is noninferentially known—see his “How to Interpret FDirect Percep-
tion_,” in Tim Crane, ed., The Contents of Experience (New York: Cambridge, 1992),
pp. 48–78.
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directly by having a special kind of mind-dependent object present
to mind. Arguably, such a view introduces an epistemic intermediary
between one’s perception and the physical objects that one’s per-
ception is of, thereby cutting us off from reality. One could say that
if one perceives the intrinsic properties of objects in virtue of per-
ceiving their situation-dependent properties, then one is similarly
cut off from the object as it is.
In contrast to the mind-dependent items that the indirect realist
invokes, situation-dependent properties do not constitute an ob-
ject that is distinct from the physical object in view. The situation-
dependency thesis does not involve a commitment to any object
over and above the physical object that one’s perception is of. An
object’s intrinsic properties and its situation-dependent properties
are properties of the very same object. Therefore, acknowledging
situation-dependent properties makes it possible to account for the
ways objects are presented while maintaining that subjects perceive
objects directly. Subjects perceive objects directly in virtue of perceiv-
ing their situation-dependent properties directly. So the suggested
way of thinking about perception differs fundamentally from indi-
rect realist views. While the indirect realist argues that we perceive
physical objects indirectly by having something mind-dependent pres-
ent to mind, the thesis presented here is that we perceive objects
directly by perceiving their situation-dependent properties directly.
This will not impress a skeptic. But the point of understanding how
objects are presented as external and mind-independent is not to fend
off skeptical worries. The point is rather to show that much of what is
typically thought of in terms of the subjectivity of perception should
rightly be thought of in terms of the situation-dependency of per-
ception. Skeptical worries arise for the situation-dependent properties
in just the way that they arise for the existence of an external world,
precisely because they are elements of the external world.
v. conclusion
My aim was to show that in order to explain how perception can
give us knowledge of objects, the way one gains knowledge through
perception must be taken seriously. The way one gains knowledge
through perception is by being presented with objects given situa-
tional features, such as the lighting conditions and one’s location
in relation to the object. If this is right, then perception is neces-
sarily situation-dependent. I spelled out this situation-dependency
thesis by arguing that the ways objects are presented can be under-
stood in terms of situation-dependent properties: external, mind-
independent properties that an object has given the situational features.
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I argued that recognizing situation-dependent properties yields
four advantages. First, it makes it possible to acknowledge that per-
ceptual experiences are not just individuated by the objects they are
of, but by the ways those objects are presented given the situational
features. On standard views, the conditions an experience must satisfy
to be accurate is only to attribute the right intrinsic properties to the
right object: the way the object is presented does not matter for
whether the experience is accurate. In contrast to such views, I have
argued that the ways objects are presented are the kind of things that
can be represented and misrepresented in just the way that intrinsic
properties can be represented and misrepresented. By understanding
the ways objects are presented in terms of mind-dependent, situation-
dependent properties we can recognize that more of experience is
subject to accuracy conditions than standard views acknowledge.
The conditions an experience must satisfy to be accurate is not just to
get the intrinsic properties right, but is also to get the situation-
dependent properties right. So the ways objects are presented are
objective contents of subjective acts of consciousness in the very same
way as objects and their intrinsic properties are objective contents of
subjective acts of consciousness. Insofar as situation-dependent prop-
erties can be represented and misrepresented in the very same way
that intrinsic properties can be represented and misrepresented, they
are systematically related to the content of states that ground our
beliefs about the world.
Second, recognizing situation-dependent properties allows for a
way to accommodate the fact that there is a wide range of viewing
conditions or situational features that can count as normal. Situation-
dependent properties change as the situational features change,
while intrinsic properties remain constant.
Third, I argued that perceiving the intrinsic properties of objects is
epistemically dependent on representing their situation-dependent
properties. If perceiving the intrinsic properties of objects is episte-
mically dependent on representing their situation-dependent prop-
erties, then representations of situation-dependent properties are a
necessary part of perceptual content. Insofar as perceptual content
necessarily involves representations of situation-dependent prop-
erties, it crucially differs from the content of a thought about the
same object.
Finally, recognizing situation-dependent properties makes it
possible to embrace the motivations that lead to phenomenalism
and indirect realism by recognizing that objects are presented a
certain way, while holding on to the intuition that subjects directly
perceive objects. The suggested way of thinking about perception is
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similar to an indirect realist approach in that perceiving the intrin-
sic properties of objects is dependent on perceiving something else.
In contrast to an indirect realist approach the intermediary is, how-
ever, not a subjective, mind-dependent intermediary. The interme-
diary is rather a second kind of external, mind-independent property
of the very same object, namely a situation-dependent property. Per-
ception of intrinsic properties is dependent on perception of situation-
dependent properties.
Views according to which perception involves representations of
mind-dependent properties (or objects) can recognize situation-
dependent properties. If they do, there will be mind-dependent
properties (or objects) that stand in representation relations both to
intrinsic properties and to situation-dependent properties. But
although formally consistent with such views, recognizing situation-
dependent properties undermines at least one central motivation
that has traditionally led to such views. If one recognizes situation-
dependent properties, no appeal to mind-dependent properties is
necessary to explain how it can be that there is a way that objects look
that is not accounted for by representing their intrinsic properties. If
this is the reason for introducing mind-dependent properties (or
objects), then one might as well drop them once situation-dependent
properties are acknowledged.
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